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As Mr. Justice Schauer has made a correct summation of 
the evidence in his dissenting opinion in this case I shall 
not attempt to do so, but wish to add my unqualified con-
currence with his statement that the evidence disclosed by the 
record is amply sufficient to sustain the findings of the jury 
as to the invalidity of the will. 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment denying probate of 
the will here involved. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 3, 
1952. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18431. In Bank. Mar. 14, 1952.] 
MARIE MARGARET MASCHIO FREDRICKSON, Peti-
tioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Respondents; 
CAREW AND ENGLISH, INC., Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Accounting-Settlement--Conclusiveness. 
-Ordinarily an order settling a :final account of an adminis-
tratrix is conclusive on unpaid creditors. 
[2] Id.- Accounting- Settlement- Vacation of Order.- There 
must be some legally recognized basis for vacating an order 
settling a :final account of an admip.istratrix; if there is none, 
the court acts in excess of its power in so acting. 
[3] !d.-Accounting-Settlement-AppeaL-No appeal lies from 
an order vacating orders settling a :final account of an admin-
istratrix, directing :final distribution and discharging an 
administratrix, as such order is not listed as an appealable one 
in Prob. Code, § 1240. 
[ 4] !d.-Accounting-Settlement-Certiorari.-Although proper 
notice of hearing on settlement of an administratrix' :final 
account be given, it cannot be said, on a certiorari proceed-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 1146; Am.Jur., 
Executors and Administrators, § 539. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 912; [2, 5, 8, 10] 
Decedents' Estates, § 910.2; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 918; [ 4, 9] 
Decedents' Estates, § 925; [6] Certiorari, § 20; [7] Certiorari, 
§ 74; [11] Certiorari, § 10. 
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ing to review an order vacating a decree settling such ac-
count, that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to give re-
lief under Code Civ. Proc., § 473, insofar as the evidence 
of excusable neglect, etc., is concerned, because certiorari 
can be granted only if it be shown that the probate court 
exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside such decree. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1068.) 
[5] !d.-Accounting-Settlement-Vacation of Decree.-Probate 
court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion to vacate a de-
cree settling the final account of an administratrix, ordering 
distribution and discharging the administratrix, on the ground 
that the account was not verified and did not show all claims 
filed or presented against the estate, that movant's claim was 
allowed by the court but had not been paid or otherwise acted 
upon, and that no notice of rejection was served on claimant; 
and to grant or deny the application in the exercise of its 
discretionary power. (Pro b. Code, § 1233; Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 473.) 
[6] Certiorari-Excess or Want of Jurisdiction.-Certiorari will 
not lie where the only excess of jurisdiction alleged relates 
to insufficiency of the evidence. 
[7] Id.-Hearing.-On certiorari matters within the discretion of 
the lower court are not reviewable. 
[8] Decedents' Estates-Accounting-Settlement-Vacation of De-
cree.-Order of probate court vacating decree settling an ad-
ministratrix' final account may be based on Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 473, although the inadvertence, excusable neglect, etc., were 
not set forth as grounds· in the notice of motion to vacate, as 
required by Code Civ. Proc., § 1010, it being sufficient that 
the notice indicated that relief should be given on those 
grounds. 
[9] Id.-Accounting--Settlement-Certiorari.-Where affidavit in 
opposition to petition to review order vacating decree settling 
administratrix' final account states that, at the hearing on 
motion to vacate, the administratrix was advised that the 
motion was made under Code Civ. Proc., § 473, which is not 
denied by her, and where she made no objection to the hear-
ing of the motion on the grounds of mistake, excusable ne-
glect, etc., it cannot be said, in the certiorari proceeding, that 
the probate court acted in excess of jurisdiction 
[10] !d.-Accounting-Settlement-Vacation of Decree.-Where 
grounds for vacating decree settling an administratrix' final 
account are raised at the hearing, and no objection is made 
by the administratrix to sufficiency of the notice of motion 
in that respect, she waives any such objection. 
[6] See Cal.Jur., Certiorari, § 4; Am.Jur., Certiorari, § 5. 
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[11] Certiorari-Excess or Want of Jurisdiction.-Assuming that 
affidavits must accompany a motion under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 473, the failure to file them with the notice of motion is 
not a jurisdictional defect vulnerable in a certiorari review. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Superior Court 
of the City and County of San Francisco, vacating judgment 
settling final account of administratrix, ordering distribution 
and discharging administratrix. T. I. Fitzpatrick, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Sefton & Anderson and Seibert L. Sefton for Petitioner. 
Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe and Caspar Willard 
Weinberger for Respondents and Real Party in Interest. 
CARTER, J.-This is a proceeding in certiorari to annul 
an order of the superior court sitting in probate vacating a 
decree settling the final account of the administratrix, order-
ing distribution and discharging the administratrix in the 
estate of Robert E. Maschio, deceased. 
Maschio having died intestate, Marie Frederickson, as guar-
dian of the estate of Esther Maschio, a minor daughter of 
the deceased, was issued letters of administration. Notice to 
creditors was duly given. Carew and English, a corporation, 
in due time and form presented to counsel for the administra-
trix its verified claim in the sum of $1,071, for the funeral 
expenses of the deceased. Apparently, the administratrix' 
name appears on the claim, but it is agreed that she did not 
approve it. The probate judge did approve it. It also appears 
that it was filed with the clerk. No notice of rejection of the 
claim was given. Counsel for the administratrix testified 
at the hearing on the motion later discussed herein that his 
office had sent the claim to decedent's sisters and he thought 
they had paid it. The claim has not been paid. 
In proper time the administratrix filed her final account 
and petition for its settlement and distribution of the estate. 
It was not verified as required by section 922 of the Probate 
Code, nor did it contain a list of claims filed or presented 
as required by that section and section 921. In the account 
it was stated that all the claims had been paid and testimony 
to the same effect was given at the hearing on the account. 
On November 29, 1950, the court made its orders settling 
the account, distributing the estate and discharging the ad-
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ministratrix. On May 28, 1951, and within six months of 
the order of settlement (see Code Civ. Proc., § 4 73), Carew 
and English made a motion to vacate those orders, stating 
as grounds in its notice of motion: 
'' 1. That the . . . account filed herein . . . was not veri-
fied, as required by Section 922 of the Probate Code; 
'' 2. That said account does not show all the claims filed 
or presented against said estate, as required by said Section 
922 of the Probate Code; 
'' 3. That CAREW & ENGLISH, INc., ... duly presented a 
claim in the sum of $1,071.00 against the estate of said 
decedent within the time prescribed by law, and at the place 
designated in the Notice to Creditors; said claim is on file 
herein and purports to have been approved by said ad-
ministratrix, and was allowed by the Court; 
'' 4. That said claim was not paid or otherwise acted upon, 
and that no notice of rejection of said claim was served on 
claimant ; 
'' 5. On all the files, pleadings and papers herein; 
'' 6. On oral testimony to be adduced at the hearing of the 
motion i. 
"7. That said Decree of Distribution and said Decree of 
Discharge are and each of them is void, for the reasons set 
forth in the grounds for this motion above stated.'' 
At the hearing on the motion counsel for the administratrix 
testified as above mentioned. Counsel for Carew and English 
asserted that there had been a fraud on the court and stressed 
the lack of verification of the account and petition for dis-
tribution. The facts above mentioned were made to appear. 
The court expressed the view that that was "enough" for it 
and agreed there was a fraud on the court and stated: "It 
would be a fraud on the Court, and the person would be 
guilty of perjury." The court also said: "Well, even the 
six months would not bar you here-this is a fraud on the 
Court-it can be brought up at any time." 
A minute order was made granting the motion and the 
administratrix seeks to have it annulled on certiorari, as-
serting that the court had no power to vacate the settlement 
as it is binding and conclusive on Carew and English. 
[1] With exceptions not here pertinent an order settling 
a final account is conclusive on unpaid creditors. (Federal 
Farm Mtg. Corp. v. Sandbe1·g, 35 Cal.2d 1 [215 P.2d 721] ; 
Estate of Mailheb~tau, 218 Cal. 202 [22 P.2d 514] ; Estate of 
Fernandez, 119 Cal. 579 [51 P. 851].) [2] There must be 
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some legally recognized basis for vacating such a final order, 
and if there is none, the court acts in excess of its power in 
so acting. [3] With reference to the remedy by certiorari, 
it is settled that no appeal lies from the order of vacation as it 
is not listed as an appealable order in section 1240 of the 
Probate Code. (Kramer v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 159 
[222 P.2d 874]; Howard v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.2d 784, 787 
[154 P.2d 849] .) Hence, the question of availability of ap-
peal is not presented. 
There is considerable discussion in the briefs as to whether 
the motion was made or granted under section 473 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, a legally recognized method of vacating 
a final judgment on the grounds of inadvertence or excusable 
neglect, because of the failure of Carew and English to con-
test the settlement of the account and Carew and English 
here base their argument in support of the order of vacation 
on that section. It is true that the section was not mentioned 
in the notice of motion, but it does point at inadvertence and 
excusable neglect inasmuch as it details what happened, that 
the claim was filed, was on its face approved by the ad-
ministratrix and judge but was not paid and no notice of 
rejection was given. At the hearing the facts were developed 
as heretofore set forth. There may have been more as the 
record on the hearing of the motion recites that "argument 
and discussion'' followed, but does not state of what it con-
sisted. [4] While proper notice of the hearing on the settle-
ment of the account was given, we cannot say on this certiorari 
proceeding that the court lacked jurisdiction to give relief 
under section 473 insofar as the evidence of excusable neglect, 
etc., is concerned, because such relief (certiorari) "could be 
granted only if it be shown that the probate court in denying 
[or granting] the motion to set aside the decree exceeded its 
jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068; and cases hereinafter 
cited.) [5] Under the authorities herein cited the probate 
court has jurisdiction to entertain the motion and to grant 
or deny the application in the exercise of its discretionary 
power. (Prob. Code, § 1233; Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) 
[6] " ... that orders granting relief [under § 473] have 
rarely been reversed and then only for an abuse of discretion. 
. . . In addition it is well settled that certiorari will not 
lie where the only excess of jurisdiction alleged relates to 
insufficiency of the evidence. (Estate of Kay, 30 Cal.2d 215, 
218 [181 P.2d 1] .) " (Kramer v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 
159, 162 [222 P.2d 874].) [7] Also, "It need hardly be 
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added that on certiorari we do not review matters within the 
discretion of the lower court." (Estate of Kay, 30 Cal.2d 
215, 226 [181 P.2d 874].) 
[8] The court had no power to and did not base its order 
of vacation on section 473, argues petitioner, because the 
inadvertence, excusable neglect, etc., were not set forth as 
grounds in the notice of motion, as required by section 1010 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, no affidavits on that subject 
accompanied it and they were not invoked at the hearing. We 
have heretofore pointed out that the notice indicated that 
relief should be given on those gro1mds, and this should be 
sufficient, when we consider that this review is of jurisdictional 
error and only such defects may be considered. [9] It is stated 
in the affidavit of counsel for Carew and English, filed here 
in opposition to the petition for the writ, that at the hearing 
on the motion petitioner was advised that the motion was made 
under section 473. 'rhat is not denied by petitioner. And at 
the hearing, discussions transpired which were not recorded. 
They may have shown that the motion was based on section 473. 
As far as appears, petitioner made no objection to the hearing 
of the motion on the grounds of mistake, excusable neglect, 
etc. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the court 
acted in excess of its jurisdiction. [10] Moreover, the grounds 
under section 4 73 having been raised at the hearing, and no 
objection having been made by petitioner to the sufficiency 
of the notice of motion in that respect, the petitioner waived 
any such objection. (Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal.2d 144 [173 
P.2d 657] ; Mann v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 92 Cal.App.2d 
439 [207 P.2d 105] ; Hecq v. Conner, 203 Cal. 504 [265 P. 
180]; Simonini v. Jay Dee Leather Products Co., 85 Cal.App. 
2d 265 [193 P.2d 53].) 
Petitioner relies upon Nason v. Sttperior Court, 39 Cal.App. 
448 [179 P. 454], and Westphal v. Westphal, 61 Cal.App.2d 
544 [143 P.2d 405], for the proposition that the notice of 
motion limited the jurisdiction of the trial court to grounds 
other than section 473. In the Nason case the motion was 
made two years after the decree of distribution was entered 
and section 4 73 could not be applied. In the Westphal case 
the grounds urged on appeal were not urged in the trial 
court. Here, accepting petitioner's claim that the notice of 
motion was insufficient, the grounds were raised without 
objection in the trial court at the hearing on the motion. 
[11] Insofar as the lack of affidavits is concerned, as-
suming they must accompany a motion under section 473, 
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the failure to file them with the notice of motion is not a 
jurisdictional defect vulnerable in a certiorari review. (Im-
pe1·ial Beverage Co. v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.2d 627 [150 
P.2d 881).) 
The order vacating the decree is affirmed. 
Gibson, C .. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied April 3, 
1952. 
[L. A. No. 22103. In Bank. Mar. 18, 1952.) 
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (a Corporation), 
Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMIS-
SION, LEO V. NOWAK et al., Respondents. 
[la, lb] Workmen's Compensation-Liens on Award.-A lien for 
unemployment disability payments made to an applicant for 
workmen's compensation must be allowed against a lump sum 
payable under a compromise agreement between him and the 
compensation insurance carrier, since such compromise pay-
ment comes within the definitions of "compensation'' as enun-
ciated in Lab. Code, §§ 3207, 5001. 
[2] !d.-Liens on Award.-In determining ~hether lien for unem-
ployment disability payments should be made against amount 
awarded applicant for workmen's compensation as result of a 
compromise, theW orkmen's Compensation Law and Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act should not be construed together in a 
manner which would defeat the legislative intent to avoid 
overlapping or duplicating payments, and which also would 
tend to defeat a substantial purpose by discouraging the 
prompt payment of benefits under the Unemployment Insur-
ance Act where there is a question whether benefits are pay-
able under the compensation law. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission denying claim of lien against amount payable 
as compensation under a compromise. Order annulled. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 197. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Workmen's Compensation, § 197. 
